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INSTITUT FÜR INFORMATIK
UND PRAKTISCHE MATHEMATIK
A Constraint-Based Algorithm for
Contract-Signing Protocols





Institut für Informatik und Praktische Mathematik der
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
Olshausenstr. 40
D – 24098 Kiel
A Constraint-Based Algorithm for
Contract-Signing Protocols




A Constraint-Based Algorithm for
Contract-Signing Protocols
Detlef Kähler and Ralf Küsters
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Abstract
Research on the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols has so far mainly
concentrated on reachability properties, such as secrecy and authentication. Only
recently it was shown that certain game-theoretic security properties, such as
balance for contract-signing protocols, are decidable in a Dolev-Yao style model
with a bounded number of sessions but unbounded message size. However, this
result does not provide a practical algorithm as it merely bounds the size of attacks.
In this paper, we prove that game-theoretic security properties can be decided
based on standard constraint solving procedures. This paves the way for extending
existing implementations and tools for reachability properties to deal with game-
theoretic security properties.
1 Introduction
One of the central results in the area of automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols
is that the security of cryptographic protocols is decidable when analyzed w.r.t. a finite
number of sessions, without a bound on the message size, and in presence of the so-
called Dolev-Yao intruder (see, e.g., [13, 1]). Based on this result, many fully automatic
tools (see, e.g., [2, 7, 12]) have been developed and successfully applied to find flaws
in published protocols, where most of these tools employ so-called constraint solving
procedures (see, e.g., [12, 7, 4]). However, the mentioned decidability result and tools
are restricted to security properties such as authentication and secrecy which are reach-
ability properties of the transition system associated with a given protocol. In contrast,
crucial properties required of contract-signing and related protocols (see, e.g., [9, 3]), for
instance abuse-freeness [9] and balance [5], are game-theoretic properties of the struc-
ture of the transition system associated with a protocol. Balance, for instance, requires
1
that in no stage of a protocol run, the intruder or a dishonest party has both a strategy
to abort the run and a strategy to successfully complete the run and thus obtain a valid
contract.
Only recently [10], the central decidability result mentioned above was extended to
such game-theoretic security properties, including, for instance, balance. However, the
decision algorithm presented there is merely based on the fact that the size of attacks can
be bounded, and hence, all potential attacks up to a certain size have to be enumerated
and checked. Clearly, this is completely impractical.
The main contribution of the present work is a constraint-based decision algorithm
for the game-theoretic security properties of the kind considered in [10]. The main
feature of our algorithm is that it can be built on top of standard constraint solving
procedures (see, e.g., [12, 7, 4] and references therein). As mentioned, such procedures
have successfully been employed for reachability properties in the past and proved to
be a good basis for practical implementations. Hence, our algorithm paves the way for
extending existing implementations and tools for reachability properties to deal with
game-theoretic security properties.
In a nutshell, our constraint-based algorithm works as follows: Given a protocol
along with the considered game-theoretic security property, first the algorithm guesses
what we call a symbolic branching structure. This structure represents a potential
attack on the protocol and corresponds to the interleavings, which are, however, linear
structures, guessed for reachability properties. In the second step of the algorithm, the
symbolic branching structure is turned into a so-called constraint system. This step
requires some care due to the branching issue and write-protected channels considered
in our model (also called secure channels here), i.e., channels that are not under the
control of the intruder. Then, a standard constraint solving procedure (see above) is
used to compute a finite sound and complete set of so-called simple constraint systems.
A simple constraint system in such a set represents a (possibly infinite) set of solutions of
the original constraint system and the sound and complete set of these simple constraint
systems represents the set of all solutions of the original constraint system. Finally, it is
checked whether (at least) one of the computed simple constraint systems in the sound
and complete set passes certain additional tests.
There are some crucial differences of our constraint-based algorithm to algorithms for
reachability properties: First, as mentioned, instead of symbolic branching structures
for reachability properties only interleavings, i.e., linear structures, need to be guessed.
Turning these interleavings into constraint systems is immediate due to the absence of
the branching issue and the absence of secure channels. Second, and more importantly,
for reachability properties it suffices if the constraint solving procedure only returns one
simple constraint system, rather than a sound and complete set. Third, the final step
of our constraint-based algorithm—performing additional tests on the simple constraint
system—is not required for reachability properties.
We emphasize that even though for reachability properties it suffices if the constraint
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solving procedure returns only one simple constraint system, standard constraint solv-
ing procedures are typically capable of computing sound and complete sets of simple
constraint systems. Any such procedure can be used by our constraint-based algorithm
as a black-box for solving constraint systems. This makes it possible to extend exist-
ing implementations and tools for reachability properties to deal with game-theoretic
properties since the core of the algorithms—solving constraint systems—remains the
same, provided that the considered cryptographic primitives can be dealt with by the
constraint solving procedure (see Section 4).
The protocol and intruder model that we use is basically the one proposed in [10],
which in turn is the “bounded session” version of a model proposed in [5]. We slightly
modify the model of [10]—without changing its expressivity and accuracy—in order to
simplify our constraint-based algorithm (see Section 2 and 3). For instance, while in
[10] intruder strategies are positional, it turns out that the constraint-based algorithm
is considerably simpler for intruder strategies which may depend on the history of the
protocol run. However, it is not hard to show that both notions of strategies are equiv-
alent in our setting, and hence, we can w.l.o.g. choose the notion of strategy that fits
best for our purpose.
Further related work. Contract-signing and related protocols have been analyzed
both manually [5], based on a relatively detailed model (as mentioned, our model is a
“bounded session” version of this model), and using finite-state model checking (see,
e.g., [14, 11]), based on a coarser finite-state model. Drielsma and Mödersheim [8] were
the first to apply an automatic tool based on constraint solving to the contract-signing
protocol by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner [3]. Their analysis is, however, restricted to
reachability properties since game-theoretic properties cannot be handled by their tool.
The results shown in the present work pave the way for extending such tools in order
to be able to analyze game-theoretic properties.
Structure of this paper. In Section 2 we recall the protocol and intruder model and
in Section 3 the intruder strategies and the game-theoretic properties first introduced
in [10], and point out the mentioned differences. Section 4 provides the necessary back-
ground on constraint solving. In Section 5, we present our constraint-based decision
algorithm along with an example and state our main result—soundness, completeness,
and termination of the algorithm, with the proof given in Section 6. We conclude in
Section 7.
2 The Protocol and Intruder Model
Our protocol and intruder model that we use basically coincides with the model first
introduced in [10], which in turn is the “bounded session” version of the model proposed
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in [5]. We only slightly modify the model in [10] in that we impose a restriction on
principals which is necessary for principals to perform feasible computations. We refer
the reader to [10] for more details on the model and examples.
In our model, a protocol is a finite set of principals and every principal is a finite
tree, which represents all possible behaviours of the principal. Each edge of such a tree
is labeled by a rewrite rule, which describes the receive-send action that is performed
when the principal takes this edge in a run of the protocol.
When a principal carries out a protocol, it traverses its tree, starting at the root. In
every node, the principal takes its current input, chooses one of the edges leaving the
node, matches the current input with the left-hand side of the rule the edge is labeled
with, sends out the message which is determined by the right-hand side of the rule, and
moves to the node the chosen edge leads to. While in the standard Dolev-Yao model (see,
e.g., [13]) inputs to principals are always provided by the intruder, in our model it can
also come from the secure channel, which the intruder does not control, i.e., the intruder
cannot delay, duplicate, remove messages, or write messages onto this channel under a
fake identity (unless he has corrupted a party). However, just as in [5], the intruder can
read the messages written onto the secure channel. We note that our results also hold
in case of read-protected secure channels. Another difference to standard Dolev-Yao
models is that, in order to be able to formulate game-theoretic properties, we explicitly
describe the behavior of a protocol as an infinite-state transition graph which comprises
all runs of a protocol.
2.1 Terms and Messages
We have a finite set V of variables, a finite set A of atoms, a finite set K of public
and private keys, an infinite set AI of intruder atoms, and a finite set N of principal
addresses. All of them are assumed to be disjoint.
The set K is partitioned into a set Kpub of public keys and a set Kpriv of private
keys. There is a bijective mapping ·−1 : K → K which assigns to every public key the
corresponding private key and to every private key its corresponding public key.
Typically, the set A contains names of principals, atomic symmetric keys, and nonces
(i.e., random numbers generated by principals). We note that we will allow non-atomic
symmetric keys as well. The atoms in AI are the nonces, symmetric keys, etc. the
intruder may generate. The elements of N are used as addresses of principals in secure
channels.
We define two kinds of terms by the following grammar, namely plain terms and
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secure channel terms:
plain-terms ::= V | A | AI | 〈plain-terms, plain-terms〉 |
{plain-terms}splain-terms | {plain-terms}aK | hash(plain-terms) |
sigK(plain-terms)
sec-terms ::= sc(N ,N , plain-terms)
terms ::= plain-terms | sec-terms | N
Plain terms, secure channel terms, and terms without variables (i.e., ground terms) are
called plain messages, secure channel messages, and messages, respectively. As usual,
〈t, t′〉 is the pairing of t and t′, the term {t}st′ stands for the symmetric encryption of t
by t′ (note that the key t′ may be any plain term), {t}ak is the asymmetric encryption of
t by k, the term hash(t) stands for the hash of t, and sigk(t) is the signature on t which
can be verified with the public key k.
A secure channel term of the form sc(n, n′, t) stands for feeding the secure channel
from n to n′ with t. A principal may only generate such a term if he knows n and t (but
not necessarily n′). This guarantees that a principal cannot impersonate other principals
on the secure channel. Knowing n grants access to secure channels with sender address
n. Let V(t) denote the set of variables occurring in the term t.
The set Sub(t) of subterms of t and the set Sub(E) of subterms of a set E of terms
is defined in the obvious way.
A (ground) substitution assigns (ground) terms to variables. The domain of a substi-
tution is denoted by dom(σ) and defined by dom(σ) = {x ∈ V | σ(x) 6= x}. Substitutions
are required to have finite domains. Given two substitutions σ and σ ′ with disjoint do-
mains, their union σ ∪ σ′ is defined in the obvious way. Given a term t, the term tσ is
obtained from t by simultaneously substituting each variable x occurring in t by σ(x).
For substitutions σ and τ we define (τ ◦ σ)(x) = τ(σ(x)) for every x.
The set of subterms of a term is defined as expected. We say that t is used as a
verification key in t′ if t′ has a subterm of the form {s}st , {s}at−1 , or sigt(s) for some term
s. Intuitively, a verification key is needed to decrypt messages or verify the signature.
For example, if a principal A receives the message m = {〈A, x〉}sa and wants to check
whether the plain text matches with t′ = 〈A, x〉, then the principal first needs to decyrpt
m with the verification key a.
2.2 Intruder
Given a set I of general messages, the (infinite) set d(I) of general messages the intruder
can derive from I is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
1. I ⊆ d(I).
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2. Composition and decomposition: Ifm,m′ ∈ d(I), then 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(I). Conversely,
if 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I) and m′ ∈ d(I).
3. Symmetric encryption and decryption: If m,m′ ∈ d(I), then {m}sm′ ∈ d(I). Con-
versely, if {m}sm′ ∈ d(I) and m′ ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I).
4. Asymmetric encryption and decryption: If m ∈ d(I) and k ∈ d(I) ∩ K, then
{m}ak ∈ d(I). Conversely, if {m}ak ∈ d(I) and k−1 ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I).
5. Hashing : If m ∈ d(I), then hash(m) ∈ d(I).
6. Signing : If m ∈ d(I), k−1 ∈ d(I) ∩ K, then sigk(m). (The signature contains the
public key but can only be generated if the corresponding private key is known.)
7. Writing onto the secure channel: If m ∈ d(I), n ∈ d(I) ∩ N , and n′ ∈ N , then
sc(n, n′, m) ∈ d(I).
8. Generating fresh constants: AI ⊆ d(I).
Each of the above rules only applies when the resulting expression is a term according
to the grammar stated above. For instance, a hash of a secure channel term is not a
term, so rule 5 does not apply when m is of the form sc(n, n′, m′).
Intuitively, n ∈ d(I) ∩ N means that the intruder has corrupted the principal with
address n and therefore can impersonate this principal when writing onto the secure
channel.
2.3 Principals and Protocols
Principal rules are of the form R⇒ S where R is a term or ε and S is a term.
A rule tree Π = (V,E, r, `) is a finite tree rooted at r ∈ V where ` maps every edge
(v, v′) ∈ E of Π to a principal rule `(v, v′).
A principal is a tuple consisting of a rule tree Π = (V,E, r, `) and a set IΠ of plain
messages, the initial knowledge of principal Π such that the following two conditions are




2. t ∈ d({R0, . . . , Rn−1}∪IΠ) for every verification key t in Rn−1 where the variables
in {R0, . . . , Rn−1} are considered as atoms.
The first condition says that every variable occurring on the right-hand side of a principal
rule `(v, v′) also occurs on the left-hand side of `(v, v′) or on the left-hand side of a
principal rule on the path from r to v. This condition is standard in Dolev-Yao models
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[13, 12] and guarantees that the output produced by a principal depends on the input
and cannot be arbitrary.
The second condition says that the decryption and signature verification operations
performed by Π when receiving a message are feasible and it is a necessary (not sufficient)
condition for the principal to only perform feasible computations. We therefore call this
condition the feasibility condition for principals. For example, this condition is not
satisfied for a principal whose rule tree only contains one edge and this edge is labeled
with the principal rule {y}sx ⇒ x since x cannot be derived from the left-hand side of
the rule. In fact, this rule allows the principal to extract the encryption key of every
ciphertext, which clearly is infeasible. For instance, given {a}sb as input the principal
would output b.
For v ∈ V , we write Π↓v to denote the subtree of Π rooted at v. For a substitution σ,
we write Πσ for the principal obtained from Π by substituting all variables x occurring
in the principal rules of Π by σ(x).
A protocol P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I) consists of a finite set of principals and a finite set
I of plain messages and principal addresses, the initial intruder knowledge. We require
that each variable occurs in the rules of only one principal, i.e., different principals must
have disjoint sets of variables. We assume that intruder atoms, i.e., elements of AI, do
not occur in P .
2.4 Transition Graphs Induced by a Protocol
A transition graph GP induced by a protocol P comprises all runs of a protocol. To
define this graph, we first introduce states and transitions between these states.
A state is of the form ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S) where
1. σ is a substitution,
2. for each i, Πi is a rule tree such that Πiσ is a principal,
3. I is a finite set of messages, the intruder knowledge, and
4. S is a finite multi-set of secure channel messages, the secure channel.
The idea is that when the transistion system gets to such a state, then the substitution
σ has been performed, the accumulated intruder knowledge is what can be derived from
I, the secure channels hold the messages in S, and for each i, Πi is the “remaining
protocol” to be carried out by principal i. This also explains why S is a multi-set:
messages sent several times should be delivered several times.
Given a protocol P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I) the initial state of P is set to be ((Π1, . . . ,Πn),
σ, I, ∅) where σ is the substitution with empty domain.
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We have three kinds of transitions: intruder, secure channel, and ε-transitions. In










i) denote rule trees. We define
under which circumstances there is a transition
((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S) τ−→ ((Π′1, . . . ,Π′n), σ′, I ′,S ′) (1)
with τ an appropriate label.
1. Intruder transitions: The transition (1) with label i,m, I exists if there exists
v ∈ Vi with (ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R ⇒ S, and a substitution σ′′ of the
variables in Rσ such that
(a) m ∈ d(I),
(b) σ′ = σ ∪ σ′′,
(c) Rσ′ = m,
(d) Π′j = Πj for every j 6= i, Π′i = Πi↓v,
(e) I ′ = I ∪ {Sσ′} if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and I ′ = I ∪ {tσ′} if S = sc(·, ·, t) for some t.
(f) S ′ = S if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S ′ = S ∪ {Sσ′} otherwise.
This transition models that principal i reads the message m from the intruder
(i.e., the public network).
2. Secure channel transitions: The transition (1) with label i,m, sc exists if there
exists v ∈ Vi with (ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R ⇒ S, and a substitution σ′′ of the
variables in Rσ such that m ∈ S, (b)–(e) from 1., and S ′ = S\{m} if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·),
and S ′ = (S \ {m}) ∪ {Sσ′} otherwise.
This transition models that principal i reads message m from the secure channel.
3. ε-transitions: The transition (1) with label i exists if there exists v ∈ Vi with
(ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = ε⇒ S such that σ′ = σ and (d), (e), (f) from above.
This transition models that i performs a step where neither a message is read from
the intruder nor from the secure channel.
We call i the principal associated with the transition, R⇒ S (for the intruder and secure
channel transitions) and ε⇒ S (for the ε-transitions) the principal rule associated with
the transition, and v the principal vertex associated with the transition.
Definition 1 Given a protocol P , the transition graph GP induced by P is the tuple
(SP , EP , qP ) where qP is the initial state of P , SP is the set of states reachable from qP
by a sequence of transitions, and EP is the set of all transitions among states in SP .
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We write q ∈ GP if q is a state in GP and q τ→ q′ ∈ GP if q τ→ q′ is a transition in GP .
Remark 2 The transition graph GP of P is a DAG since by performing a transition
the size of the first component of a state decreases. While the graph may be infinite
branching, the maximal length of a path in this graph is bounded by the total number of
edges in the principals Πi of P .
3 Intruder Strategies and Strategy Properties
In this section, we define intruder strategies on transition graphs and the goal the
intruder tries to achieve following his strategy.
As mentioned in the introduction, while in [10] positional intruder strategies have
been considered where the strategy of the intruder at a global state of the protocol run
may only depend on the current state, here we allow the intruder to take the whole path
leading to this state (i.e., the history) into account. While this potentially provides the
intruder with more power, these notions are in fact equivalent (see Proposition 4). The
main motivation for the new notion of strategy is that it is much better suited for the
constraint solving approach (Section 5).
To define intruder strategies, we introduce the notion of a strategy tree, which cap-
tures that the intruder has a way of acting such that regardless of how the other prin-
cipals act he achieves a certain goal, where goal in our context means that a state will
be reached where the intruder can derive certain constants and cannot derive others,
e.g., for balance, the intruder tries to obtain IntruderHasContract but tries to prevent
HonestPartyHasContract from occurring (see [10] for more details).
Definition 3 For q ∈ GP a q-strategy tree Tq = (V,E, r, `V , `E) is an unordered tree
where every vertex v ∈ V is mapped to a state `V (v) ∈ GP and every edge (v, v′) ∈ E is
mapped to a label of a transition such that the following conditions are satisfied for all
v, v′ ∈ V , principals j, messages m, and states q ′, q′′:
1. `V (r) = q.
2. `V (v)
`E(v,v
′)−→ `V (v′) ∈ GP for all (v, v′) ∈ E.
3. If `V (v) = q
′ and q′
j−→ q′′ ∈ GP , then there exists v′′ ∈ V such that (v, v′′) ∈ E,
`V (v
′′) = q′′, and `E(v, v
′′) = j.
4. If `V (v) = q
′ and q′
j,m,sc−→ q′′ ∈ GP , then there exists v′′ ∈ V such that (v, v′′) ∈ E,
`V (v
′′) = q′′, and `E(v, v′′) = j,m, sc.
5. If (v, v′) ∈ E, `E(v, v′) = j,m, I, and there exists q′′ 6= `V (v′) with `V (v) j,m,I−→ q′′ ∈
GP , then there exists v′′ with (v, v′′) ∈ E, `E(v, v′′) = j,m, I and `V (v′′) = q′′.
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The second condition in the above definition guarantees that all edges in Tq cor-
respond to transitions in GP . The third condition says that every ε-transition of the
original transition system must be present in the strategy graph; this is because the in-
truder should not be able to prevent a principal from performing an ε-rule. The fourth
condition is similar: the intruder should not be able to block secure channels. The fifth
condition says that although the intruder can choose to send a particular message to a
particular principal, he cannot decide which transition this principal uses (if the message
matches two rules).
Note that if `V (v) = q
′ in a q-strategy tree Tq, then there exists a path from q to q′
in GP . By Remark 2 this implies that Tq has finite depth.
Let C,C ′ ⊆ A ∪ K ∪ N . We say that a q-strategy tree Tq satisfies (C,C ′) if for all
leaves v of Tq all elements from Ci can be derived by the intruder and all elements from
C ′ cannot, i.e., C ⊆ d(I) and C ′ ∩ d(I) = ∅ where I denotes the intruder knowledge in
state `V (v).
A strategy property is a tuple ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)) where Ci, C
′
i ⊆ A ∪ K ∪ N .
A state q ∈ GP satisfies ((C1, C ′1), . . . , (Cs, C ′s)) if there exist q-strategy trees T1, . . . , Ts
such that every Ti satisfies (Ci, C ′i).
The decision problem g-Strategy (with general intruder strategy) asks, given a
protocol P and a strategy property ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)), whether there exists a state
q ∈ GP that satisfies the property. In this case we write (P, (C1, C ′1), . . . , (Cs, C ′s)) ∈
g-Strategy.
Note that in a q-strategy tree Tq there may exist vertices v′ 6= v with `V (v′) = `V (v)
such that the subtrees Tq↓v and Tq↓v′ of Tq rooted at v and v′, respectively, are not
isomorphic. In other words, the intruder’s strategy may depend on the path that leads
to a state (i.e., the history) rather than on the state alone, as is the case for positional
strategies.
As mentioned, the strategies defined in [10] are positional and can therefore be de-
fined as subgraphs of GP . This is equivalent to postulating that in q-strategy trees Tq
different subtrees rooted at vertices with the same vertex label are isomorphic. Fol-
lowing common terminology, we call such a q-strategy tree positional. Now, we define
p-Strategy analogously to g-Strategy with positional intruder strategies.
The following proposition shows that as far as the strategy properties are concerned
there is no difference between positional and non-positional strategies.
Proposition 4 (P, (C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)) ∈ g-Strategy iff (P, (C1, C ′1), . . . , (Cl, C ′l))
∈ p-Strategy
Proof. It suffices to show that for every q ∈ GP and (C,C ′) ⊆ A∪K∪N there exists
a q-strategy tree which satisfies (C,C ′) iff there exists a positional q-strategy tree which
satisfies (C,C ′). The direction from right to left is trivial. For the other direction,
let Tq be a q-strategy tree which satisfies (C,C ′). If there exist v′ 6= v in Tq with
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`V (v) = `V (v
′) = q′, then it is not hard to see that the tree obtained by replacing Tq↓v′
with Tq↓v (and consistently renaming the vertices) is still a q-strategy tree satisfying
(C,C ′). Now, iteratively starting with the subtrees of maximum depth and replacing
all subtrees rooted at vertices labeled with the same state by one of the subtrees among
them, we obtain the desired positional q-strategy tree. 2
In [10] it was shown that p-Strategy is decidable. As an immediate corollary of
Proposition 4 we obtain:
Corollary 5 g-Strategy is decidable.
4 Constraint Solving
In this section, we introduce constraint systems and state the well-known fact that
procedures for solving these systems exist (see, e.g., [12] for more details). In Section 5,
we will then use such a procedure as a black-box for our constraint-based algorithm.
A constraint is of the form t : T where t is a plain term and T is a finite non-empty
set of plain terms. Since we will take care of secure channel terms outside of constraint
solving, we can disallow secure channel terms in constraints.
A constraint system C is a tuple consisting of a sequence s = t1 : T1, . . . , tn : Tn of
constraints and a substitution τ such that the domain of τ is disjoint from the set of
variables occurring in s and τ(x), for all x, only contains variables also occurring in s.
We call C simple if ti is a variable for all i.
A ground substitution σ where the domain of σ is the set of variables in t1 :
T1, . . . , tn : Tn is a solution of C (σ ` C) if tiσ ∈ d(Tiσ) for every i. We call σ ◦ τ (the
composition of σ and τ read from right to left) a complete solution of C (σ ◦ τ `c C)
with τ as above.
For a variable x in C, define occ(x) ∈ {1, . . . , n} to be the minimal index such that
x ∈ V(tocc(x)), i.e., occ(x) is the index of the first constraint in the sequence where x
occurs on the left-hand side of this constraint.
We call a constraint system C valid if it satisfies the origination and monotonicity
property as defined in [12], i.e.:
1. V(Ti) ⊆ V({t1, . . . , ti−1}).
2. T1 ⊆ Ti for every i = 1, . . . , n.
3. For every i and x ∈ V(Ti), there exists T ⊆ Ti such that V(T ) ∩ (V({tocc(x),
. . . , tn}) \ V({t1, . . . , tocc(x)−1}) = ∅ and d(Tocc(x)σ) ⊆ d(Tσ) for every σ ` C.
These are standard restrictions on constraint systems imposed by constraint solving pro-
cedures. The first condition, the origination property, corresponds to the first condition
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imposed on principals. The second and third condition form the monotonicity property.
The third condition captures the fact that the intruder does not forget information.
A simple constraint system C obviously has a solution. One such solution, which we
denote by σC , replaces all variables in C by new intruder atoms a ∈ AI where different
variables are replaced by different atoms. We call σC the solution associated with C and
σC ◦ τ the complete solution associated with C.
Given a constraint system C, a finite set {C1, . . . ,Cn} of simple constraint systems
is called a sound and complete solution set for C if {ν | ν `c C} = {ν | ∃i s.t. ν `c Ci}.
Note that C does not have a solution iff n = 0.
The following fact is well-known (see, e.g., [7, 12, 4] and references therein):
Fact 1 There exists a procedure which given a valid constraint system C outputs a sound
and complete solution set for C.
While different constraint solving procedures (and implementations thereof) may
compute different sound and complete solution sets, our constraint-based algorithm in-
troduced in Section 5 works with any of these procedures. It is only important that the
set computed is sound and complete. As already mentioned in the introduction, to de-
cide reachability properties it suffices if the procedure only returns one simple constraint
system in the sound and complete set. However, the constraint solving procedures pro-
posed in the literature are typically capable of returning a sound and complete solution
set.
In what follows, we fix one such procedure and call it the constraint solver. More
precisely, w.l.o.g., we consider the constraint solver to be a non-deterministic algorithm
which non-deterministically chooses a simple constraint system from the sound and
complete solution set and returns this system as output. We require that for every
simple constraint system in the sound and complete solution set, there is a run of the
constraint solver that returns this system. If the sound and complete set is empty, the
constraint solver always returns no.
We note that while standard constraint solving procedures can deal with the cryp-
tographic primitives considered here, these procedures might need to be extended when
adding further cryptographic primitives. For example, this is the case for private con-
tract signatures, which are used in some contract signing protocols [9] and were taken
into account in [10]. However, constraint solving procedures can easily be extended to
deal with these signatures. We have not considered them here for brevity of presentation
and since the main focus of the present work is not to extend constraint solving proce-
dures but to show how these procedures can be employed to deal with game-theoretic
security properties.
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5 The Constraint-Based Algorithm
We now present our constraint-based algorithm, called SolveStrategy, for deciding prob-
lem g-Strategy. As mentioned, it uses a standard constraint solver (Fact 1) as a
subprocedure.
In what follows, we present the main steps performed by SolveStrategy, with more
details given in subsequent sections. The input to SolveStrategy is a protocol P and a
strategy property ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)).
1. Guess a symbolic branching structure B, i.e., guess a symbolic path πs from the
initial state of P to a symbolic state qs and a symbolic qs-strategy tree T si,qs for
every (Ci, C
′
i) starting from this state (see Section 5.1 for more details).
2. Derive from the symbolic branching structure B = πs, T s1,qs, . . . , T sl,qs and the strat-
egy property ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)) the induced and valid (!) constraint system
C = CB (see Section 5.2 for the definition). Then, run the constraint solver on
C. If it returns no, then halt. Otherwise, let C′ be the simple constraint system
returned by the solver. (Recall that C′ belongs to the sound and complete solution
set and is chosen non-deterministically by the solver.)
3. Let ν be the complete solution associated with C′. Check whether ν when applied
to B yields a valid path in GP from the initial state of P to a state q and q-strategy
trees Ti,q satisfying (Ci, C ′i) for every i. If so, output yes and B with ν applied,
and otherwise return no (see Section 5.3 for more details).
Note that the above state, path, and strategy trees are not symbolic anymore and
that in case yes is returned, B with ν applied yields a concrete solution of the
problem instance (P, (C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)).
We emphasize that, for simplicity of presentation, SolveStrategy is formulated as a non-
deterministic algorithm. Hence, the overall decision of SolveStrategy is yes if there exists
at least one computation path where yes is returned. Otherwise, the overall decision is
no (i.e., (P, (C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)) /∈ g-Strategy).
In the following three sections, the three steps of SolveStrategy are further explained.
Our main result is the following theorem, with the proof presented in Section 6:
Theorem 6 SolveStrategy is a decision procedure for g-Strategy.
While we know that g-Strategy is decidable from Corollary 5, the main point of The-
orem 6 is that SolveStrategy uses standard constraint solving procedures as a black-box,
and as such, is a good basis for extending existing practical constraint-based algorithms
for reachability properties to deal with game-theoretic security properties.
The proof of Theorem 6 (see Section 6) is quite different from the cut-and-paste










sc(2, 1, 〈x, b〉)⇒ x
a⇒ c1 y⇒ c2x⇒ c2
{y}sk ⇒ y
Π1:
Figure 1: Protocol Pex = ({Π1,Π2}, I0) with I0 = {{a}sk, {b}sk}, initial knowledge
{1, a, b, k, c1, c2} of Π1 and initial knowledge {2, a, b} of Π2.
a “small” attack. Here we rather make use of the fact that procedures for computing
sound and complete solution sets exist, which on the one hand makes our proof (and
also our algorithm) more modular and easier to extend, but on the other hand requires
an appropriate encoding of the problem into constraint systems.
We note that if we used positional strategies as in [10], SolveStrategy would have to
be extended to guess the symbolic states of symbolic branching structures that coincide
after the substitution is applied. To avoid this, we employ the strategies with history
as explained above.
As mentioned in the introduction, unlike constraint-based algorithms for reachability
properties, we cannot dispense with step 3. of SolveStrategy and it might not suffice to
compute just one simple constraint system. This is illustrated in Section 5.3.
5.1 Guessing the Symbolic Branching Structure
To describe the first step of SolveStrategy in more detail, we first define symbolic branch-
ing structures, which consist of symbolic paths and symbolic strategy trees. To define
symbolic paths and strategy trees, we need to introduce symbolic states, transitions,
and trees. These notions will be illustrated by the example in Figure 1
A symbolic state qs is a tuple ({Πi}i, I,S) consisting of a finite family {Πi}i of rule
trees, a finite set I of terms (which may contain variables), and a finite multi-set S of
secure channel terms (which may contain variables). Note that a symbolic state does
not contain a substitution.
A symbolic transition is a transition between symbolic states and is of the form
((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I,S) τ−→ ((Π′1, . . . ,Π′n), I ′,S ′) (2)
with τ an appropriate label. Just as for (concrete) transitions, symbolic transitions
have to satisfy certain conditions and we distinguish between symbolic intruder, secure
channel, and ε-transitions. The conditions are formulated with respect to a set X of
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variables and an identifier κ, where X will later be defined to be the set of “used”
variables at vertex κ (and its ancestors) in a symbolic strategy tree. When performing
a symbolic transition, new variables, i.e., those not in X , are replaced by new copies,
i.e., copies that do not appear anywhere else in a symbolic strategy tree. These new
copies are obtained by indexing the variables with κ. The new copies are needed since
a symbolic strategy tree comprises different runs of a protocol, and hence, the same
principal rule may be performed in different runs with different substitutions of the
variables. By introducing new copies, we guarantee that the different applications of
the same principal rule do not interfere (as far as the new variables are concerned). In










i) denote rule trees.
1. Symbolic intruder transitions: Transition (2) with label τ = i, v, I exists if v ∈ Vi
with (ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R⇒ S for some R and S such that
(a) for every j 6= i we have Π′j = Πj and Π′i is obtained from Πi↓v by replacing
every occurrence of a variable x ∈ V(R) \ X by the copy xκ,
(b) I ′ = I ∪ {t′} where t = S if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S = sc(·, ·, t) otherwise, where
t′ is obtained from t by replacing variables x ∈ V(R) \ X by xκ.
(c) S ′ = S if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S ′ = S ∪ {S ′} otherwise, where S ′ is obtained
from S by replacing variables x ∈ V(R) \ X by xκ.
2. Symbolic secure channel transitions: Transition (2) with label τ = i, v, R′, sc exists
if v ∈ Vi with (ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R ⇒ S such that R′ ∈ S, (a) and (b)
from 1., and S ′ = S \ {R′} if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S ′ = (S \ {R′}) ∪ {S ′} otherwise.
3. Symbolic ε-transitions: Transition (2) with label τ = i, v exists if v ∈ Vi with
(ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = ε⇒ S with (a)–(c) from above.
Analogously to (concrete) transitions, we call i the principal associated with the tran-
sition, R ⇒ S (for the intruder and secure channel transitions) and ε ⇒ S (for the
ε-transitions) the principal rule associated with the transition, and v the principal vertex
associated with the transitions.
After applying one of the above symbolic transitions, the set of used variables is
updated to be the union of X and the variables occurring on the left-hand side of
the principal rule associated with the transition, i.e., the set is X ∪ (V(R) \ X )κ for
symbolic intruder and secure channel transitions, and X for symbolic ε-transitions where
(V(R)\X )κ is the set of variables in V(R)\X indexed by the identifier κ of the transition.
We can now define symbolic paths and symbolic strategy trees as special cases of
symbolic trees. Let P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I0).
For a symbolic state qs associated with a set X of variables (used so far), a symbolic
qs-tree is an unordered vertex- and edge-labeled tree of the form T sqs = (V,E, r, `V , `E)










(I2 ∪ {xh7 , yh8 , c2}, ∅)(I2 ∪ {xh7 , yh8 , c2}, ∅)
(I0, ∅)
2, g3
(I2, {sc(2, 1, 〈b, b〉)})
1, f2, sc(2, 1, 〈b, b〉), sc
(I2 ∪ {xh7}, ∅)
1, f3, I
1, f6, I
(I1, {sc(2, 1, 〈a, b〉)})
1, f2, sc(2, 1, 〈a, b〉), sc
(I1 ∪ {xh3}, ∅)
1, f3, I
1, f6, I 1, f5, I
Tex:
(I2 ∪ {xh7 , yh8}, ∅)
(I1 ∪ {xh3 , yh4 , c2}, ∅)
(I1 ∪ {xh3 , yh4}, ∅)
Figure 2: Symbolic strategy tree Tex for the protocol Pex with the first component of
the symbolic states omitted, I1 = I0 ∪ {〈a, b〉}, and I2 = I0 ∪ {〈b, b〉}. The strategy
property we consider is ((Cex, C
′
ex)) = (({c2}, {c1})).
which maps vertices to symbolic states, and edge labeling function `E which maps edges
to labels of symbolic transitions such that




′)−→ `V (v′) is a symbolic transition w.r.t. the set Xv of used variables in v
and identifier v′ for all (v, v′) ∈ E where for the root r we set Xr = X and for all
other vertices in T sqs the set Xv is determined by the symbolic transition applied





v∈V Xv be the set of used variables in T sqs . The symbolic transition
`V (v)
`E(v,v
′)−→ `V (v′) is called the symbolic transition corresponding to (or associated with)
(v, v′).
Figure 2 depicts a symbolic qs0-tree Tex for Pex (Figure 1) where qs0 = ({Π1,Π2},
I0, ∅) is the symbolic initial state of Pex and the set of used variables associated with
qs0 is empty. The first component of the symbolic states in this tree have been omitted
for the sake of presentation. Note that following our naming convention, copies of the
variables x and y have been introduced, namely xh3, xh7 , yh4, yh8.
A symbolic path πs of P is a symbolic qs-tree where qs = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I0, ∅) is the
symbolic initial state of P , the set of used variables associated with qs is empty, and
every vertex has at most one successor.
For a symbolic state qs associated with a set X of used variables a symbolic qs-
strategy tree is a finite symbolic qs-tree T sqs = (V,E, r, `V , `E) which in addition to the
conditions on symbolic trees also satisfies the following conditions:
16
3. For every v and every symbolic ε-transition from `V (v) with label τ = i, n, there
exists v′ with (v, v′) ∈ E such that `E(v, v′) = i, n.
4. For all (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ E where v′ 6= v′′, `E(v, v′) = j ′, n′, and `E(v, v′′) = j ′′, n′′ it
follows that j ′ 6= j ′′ or n′ 6= n′′.
5. For all (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ E where v′ 6= v′′, `E(v, v′) = j ′, n′, R′, sc, and `E(v, v′) =
j ′′, n′′, R′′, sc it follows that j ′ 6= j ′′, n′ 6= n′′, or R′ 6= R′′.
6. For all (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ E where v′ 6= v′′, `E(v, v′) = j ′, n′, I and `E(v, v′′) =
j ′′, n′′, I it follows that j ′ = j ′′ and n′ 6= n′′.
Condition 3. says that all symbolic ε-transitions that can be taken are present in the
symbolic strategy tree. Condition 4. prevents superfluous symbolic ε-transitions, i.e.,
different edges with the same label of a symbolic ε-transition. Condition 5. is analogous
for symbolic secure channel transitions. Condition 6. implies that for all direct successors
v1, . . . , vh of v in T sqs with `E(v, vj) = ij, fj, I we have that (i :=)i1 = · · · = ih. That
is, when following his strategy, the intruder may only send a message to one principal
Πi. However, given this message, Πi might be able to apply different principal rules. In
case h > 1, we interpret this as guessing that all principal rules R1 ⇒ S1, . . . , Rh ⇒ Sh
in the labels of (ri, f1), . . . , (ri, fh) of Πi where ri is the root of Πi can be applied given
the message delivered by the intruder and no other rules. In the constraint system to
be constructed (2. step of SolveStrategy) we will therefore guarantee that the R1, . . . , Rh
are unified and in the third step of SolveStrategy we check that no other rules can be
applied.
The symbolic tree Tex depicted in Figure 2 is in fact a symbolic qs0-strategy tree
where qs0 = ({Π1,Π2}, I0, ∅) is the symbolic initial state of Pex.
Given a protocol P , we call B = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl a symbolic branching structure of P
if
1. πs is a symbolic path of P where the label of the leave is qs for some symbolic
state qs.
2. T si is a symbolic qs-strategy of P tree where the root of T si coincides with the
leave of πs and qs is associated with the set Xπs of used variables of πs for every
i, and
3. the sets of vertices of the T si are disjoint, except that they share a common root.
Note that a symbolic branching structure is a symbolic qs0-tree where the root is the
root of πs and q0s is the label of this root, and hence, q
s
0 is the symbolic initial state of
P . By our naming convention, we have that XT si ∩ XT sj = Xπs for every i 6= j.
Obviously, there is a non-deterministic exponential time algorithm which given P
can guess all possible symbolic branching structures.
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For the strategy property ((Cex, C
′
ex)) = (({c2}, {c1})), we can consider Tex (Figure 2)
also as a symbolic branching structure Bex of Pex where the path π
s is empty and l = 1.
5.2 Constructing and Solving the Induced Constraint System
We now show how the constraint system C = CB is derived from the symbolic branching
structure B = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl from the first step of SolveStrategy and the given strategy
property ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)). This constraint system can be shown to be valid, and
hence, by Fact 1, a constraint solver can be used to solve it.
In the next section, we first illustrate how C is derived from B and the strategy
property by the example in Figure 1, with a formal definition provided in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Illustrating the Construction by an Example
Before turning to the example, we informally explain how to encode in a constraint
system communication involving the secure channel. The basic idea is that we write
messages intended for the secure channel into the intruder’s knowledge and let the
intruder deliver these messages. The problem is that while every message in the secure
channel can only be read once, the intruder could try to deliver the same message
several times. To prevent this, every such message when written into the intruder’s
knowledge is encrypted with a new key not known to the intruder and this key is also
(and only) used in the principal rule which according to the symbolic branching structure
is supposed to read the message. This guarantees that the intruder cannot abusively
deliver the same message several times to unintended recipients or make use of these
encrypted messages in other contexts. Here we use the feasibility condition on principals
introduced in Section 2, namely that verification keys can be derived by a principal. As
explained before, without this condition, a principal rule of the form {y}sx ⇒ x would
be allowed even if the principal does not know (i.e., cannot derive) x. Such a rule would
equip a principal with the unrealistic ability to derive any secret key from a ciphertext.
Hence, the intruder, using this principal as an oracle, could achieve this as well and
could potentially obtain the new keys used to encrypt messages intended for the secure
channel.
We now turn to our example and explain how the (valid) constraint system, which
we call Cex derived from Bex and ((Cex, C
′
ex)) looks like and how it is derived from Bex,
where Bex, as explained above, is simply the symbolic strategy tree Tex (Figure 2): Cex
is the following sequence of constraints with an empty substitution where k1, k2, k3 ∈ A
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are new atoms and we write t1, . . . , tn instead of {t1, . . . , tn}.
1. {〈xh3 , b〉}sk1 : I1, {〈a, b〉}sk1
2. {〈xh7 , b〉}sk2 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2
3. {yh4}sk : I1, {〈a, b〉}sk1 , xh3
4. {yh8}sk : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7
5. yh4 : I1, {〈a, b〉}sk1 , xh3, yh4
6. xh7 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7, yh8
7. yh8 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7, yh8
8. {xh7}sk3 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7, yh8, {yh8}sk3
9. c2 : I1, {〈a, b〉}sk1 , xh3, yh4, c2
10. c2 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7, yh8, c2
11. c2 : I2, {〈b, b〉}sk2, xh7, yh8, c2
This constraint system is obtained from Bex as follows: We traverse the vertices of Bex
in a top-down breadth first manner. Every edge induces a constraint except those edges
which correspond to symbolic ε-transitions. This is how the constraints 1.–7. come
about where 1., 3., and 5. are derived from the left branch of Bex and 2., 4., 6., and 7.
from the right branch. Note that in 1. and 2. we encode the communication with the
secure channel by encrypting the terms with new keys k1 and k2. The terms {〈a, b〉}sk1
and {〈b, b〉}sk2 are not removed anymore from the right-hand side of the constraints,
i.e., from the intruder knowledge in order for Cex to be valid, in particular, satisfy the
monotonicity property of constraint systems. As explained above, since we use new
keys and due to feasibility condition on principals, this does not cause problems. The
constraints 9.–11. are used to ensure that c2 can be derived at every leaf of Tex, a
requirement that comes from our example security property ((Cex, C
′
ex)) where Cex =
{c2}. In vertex h8 of Tex two symbolic intruder transitions leave the vertex, which, as
explained above, means that the associated principal rules should both be able to read
the message delivered by the intruder. Constraint 8. ensures that the left-hand sides of
these principal rules are unified, where again we use the “trick” of encrypting messages
with new keys. For correctness and completeness of our algorithm, constraint 8. is not
necessary, but it helps to reduce the search space (see also Section 5.2.2).
Let C1 and C2 be constraint systems with empty sequences of constraints and the
substitution ν1 = {xh3 7→ a, xh7 7→ b, yh4 7→ a, yh8 7→ b} and ν2 = {xh3 7→ a, xh7 7→
b, yh4 7→ b, yh8 7→ b}, respectively. It is easy to see that {C1,C2} is a sound and
complete solution set for Cex. Since Cex is valid, such a set can be computed by the
constraint solver (Fact 1).
5.2.2 Formal Definition
We now provide a more formal construction of the constraint system C = CB from




1), . . . , (Cl, C
′
l)).
For the sake of presentation, the translation from B into the constraint system C
is performed in several steps. In the first two steps, B is transformed, and in the last
step the branching structure obtained this way is turned into the constraint system C.
In the first step, B is transformed to get rid of secure channel terms generated by the
intruder. In the second, step we encode the communication with the secure channel as
explained in Section 5.2.1.
Encoding the derivation of secure channel terms. An intruder does not have
secure channel terms in the set of messages given to him. Hence, to construct a term
sc(n, n′, m) he has to derive n and m (not necessarily n′). Since the addresses such as n
may only occur in the first or second component of a secure channel term and the intruder
cannot read these components, the intruder cannot derive a new address. Hence, the
only addresses the intruder knows are those in his initial intruder knowledge. Thus, to
check whether the intruder can construct sc(n, n′, m), we only need to check whether
n belongs to his initial intruder knowledge and whether he can derive m. Therefore,
we replace in every symbolic intruder transition q
τ−→ q′ associated with an edge in B
the left-hand side of the associated principal rule by R if it is of the form sc(n, n′, R)
and n belongs to the intruder knowledge of q. If there is a transition and an associated
principal rule with a left-hand side of the form sc(n, n′, R) but where n does not belong
to the intruder knowledge of q, then SolveStrategy stops. We refer to the symbolic
branching structure obtained by the transformation just described as B̂.
Encoding secure channel communication. As already explained in Section 5.2.1,
we want make the secure channel component in symbolic states superfluous and in-
stead, as in the standard Dolev-Yao model, let the intruder handle all communication.
We therefore write messages intended for the secure channel into the intruder’s knowl-
edge and let the intruder deliver these messages. The problem is that while every
message in the secure channel can only be read once, the intruder could try to deliver
the same message several times. Therefore, when written into the intruder’s knowledge,
the messages are encrypted with a new key not known to the intruder and this key is
also (and only) used in the principal rules which according to the symbolic branching
structure are supposed to read the message. This guarantees that the intruder cannot
abusively deliver the same message several times to unintended recipiences or make use
of these encrypted messages in other contexts. Following this idea, we now present the
transformation of B̂: In what follows, with “new key” we mean a constant in A that
does not occur anywhere else and which, in particular, the intruder does not (and will
not get to) know.
For every vertex v of B̂ and every successor v′ of v in B̂ do the following (we travers
the vertices of B̂ in a top-down breadth first manner starting with the root of B̂): If in
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the transition associated with the edge (v, v′) of B̂ a message of the form sc(n, n′, R) is
written into the secure channel, then generate a new key kv′ and write {R}skv′ into the
intruder knowledge at v′ and all successors of v′ in B̂. Also, starting from v′, find all
vertices v′′ in B̂ of minimal distance from v′ (where the distance is measured in terms
of the length of paths) such that v′′ has an outgoing secure channel transition where
sc(n, n′, R) is read, i.e., the label of the transition is of the form ·, ·, sc(n, n′, R), sc. For
all such outgoing transitions of v′′ (there may be more than one), replace sc(n, n′, R) in
the label by {R}skv′ and replace the left-hand side of the principal rule associated with
the transition by {R′}skv′ → · where the principal rule is of the form sc(n, n
′, R′)→ ·.
We refer to the symbolic branching structure resulting from the transformation just
described by B.
We call {R}skv′ the (secure channel) encoding term associated with kv′ . If a ground
substitution is applied to this term, we call it the (secure channel) encoding message
associated with kv′ . We call the keys introduced in the step described above secure
channel keys (sc-keys) and denote the set of secure channel keys by Ksc. We refer to the
key generated for the edge (v, v′) by kv′ (if any).
Deriving the constraint system. From B we now derive the constraint system
C. The substitution τ of C is defined to be empty. The sequence of constraints is
constructed by iteratively adding one constraint at the end of the sequence as follows:
1. We traverse the vertices of B in a top-down breadth first manner starting with the
root of B (and hence, the root of πs) and for every vertex v of B we do the following:
For every successor v′ of v where the corresponding transition of the edge (v, v ′)
is a symbolic secure channel or intruder transition add the constraint R : I given
that the intruder knowledge in v is I and that the left-hand side of the principal
rule associated with the transition is R. (We call the constraints of this kind the
intruder constraints of C.) In addition, if v has more than one outgoing symbolic
intruder transition, then let v1, . . . , vn denote all the corresponding successors of
v, let R1, . . . , Rn denote the left-hand sides of the principal rules associated with
the respective transitions, and let k denote a new key. Add the constraint
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk : I, {〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk (3)
where I is defined as above. (This last constaint forces the unification of the Ri.
We therefore call constraints of this kind the unification constraints of C.)
2. For every i and leave v of T si add the constraint a : I for every a ∈ Ci where I is
the intruder’s knowledge in the state associated with v. (We call these constraints
the strategy property constraints of C.)
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We note that for correctness and completeness of our algorithm the constraint (3) is not
necessary. But in an optimized version of our algorithm it helps to reduce the search
space.
This completes the construction of C. To be able to apply Fact 1, we need the
following lemma, which can easily be verified:
Lemma 7 C is a valid constraint system.
To prove this lemma, we use that secure channel encoding messages are not removed
anymore from the intruder’s knowledge. Also, in the constraint (3) the terms Ri (and
hence, there variables) occur in the constraints Ri : I previously added to the constraint
sequence.
As a consequence of this lemma and Fact 1, we can employ the constraint solver to
solve C.
5.3 Checking the Induced Substitutions
Let B = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl be the symbolic branching structure obtained in the first step of
SolveStrategy and let C′ be the simple constraint system returned by the constraint solver
when applied to C = CB in the second step of SolveStrategy. Let ν be the complete
solution associated with C′ (see Section 4). We emphasize that for our algorithm to
work, it is important that ν replaces the variables in C′ by new intruder atoms from AI
not occurring in B.
Basically, we want to check that when applying ν to B, which yields ν(B) =
ν(πs), ν(T s1 ), . . . , ν(T sl ), we obtain a solution of the problem instance (P, (C1, C ′1), . . . ,
(Cl, C
′
l)). Hence, we need to check whether i) ν(π
s) corresponds to a path in GP from
the initial state of GP to a state q ∈ GP and ii) ν(T si ) corresponds to a q-strategy tree for
(Ci, C
′
i) for every i. However, since ν is a complete solution of C, some of these condi-
tions are satisfied by construction. In particular, ν(πs) is guaranteed to be a path in GP
starting from the initial state. Also, the conditions 1.–3. of strategy trees (Definition 3)
do not need to be checked and we know that ν(T si ) satisfies (Ci, ∅). Hence, SolveStrategy
only needs to make sure that 4. and 5. of Definition 3 are satisfied for every ν(T si ) and
that ν(T si ) fulfills (∅, C ′i).
More concretely, SolveStrategy checks the following conditions for every i where
1. corresponds to checking wether ν(T si ) satisfies (Ci, ∅), 2.,(a) corresponds to check-
ing 4. of Definition 3, and 2.,(b) corresponds to checking 5. of Definition 3:
1. For every leave v of T si it holds that C ′i ∩ d(Iν) = ∅ where I is the intruder
knowledge in the state associated with v.
2. For every vertex v in T si the following conditions are satisfied: Let ({Π′h}h, I, S)
be the symbolic state associated with v in T si with Π′h = (V ′h, E ′h, r′h, `′h).
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(a) For every m ∈ Sν, h, n′h such that
i. (r′h, n
′





h) = R→ · for some R, and
iii. Rν matches with m
there exists a successor v′ of v in T si such that the label of the edge of (v, v′)
in T si is h, n′h, R′, sc for some R′ with R′ν = m.
(b) If there exists a successor of v′ in T si such that





h) = R→ · for some R, and
iii. there exists n′′h 6= n′h with (r′h, n′′h) ∈ E ′h, `′h(r′h, n′′h) = R′ → · for some R′,
and R′ν matches with R̂ν where R̂ is obtained from R by replacing all
variables of the form x in R, i.e., those variables not indexed by vertices
yet, by xv′ ,
then there exists v′′ such that (v, v′′) is an edge in T si and the label of (v, v′′)
is h, n′′h, I.
It is clear that the tests in 2. can easily be performed given ν and T si . In [6] it was
shown that that derivation problem, i.e., the problem of deciding m ∈ d(I) given a
ground term m and a finite set of ground terms I, can be decided in polynomial time.
Hence, 1. can also be checked efficiently in the size of the security property and Iν.
If the above checks are successful, we say that ν is valid for B. Our algorithm
SolveStrategy outputs yes and ν(B) if ν is valid for B.
In our example, the induced substitution for Ci is νi as Ci does not contain any
variables. It can easily be verified that with C′ = C2 and the induced substitution ν2,
the above checks are all successful. However, 2.,(b) fails for C′ = C1 and ν1 because in
h4 the rule a⇒ c1 could also be applied but it is not present in Bex. In fact, Bexν1 would
not yield a solution of the instance (Pex, ((Cex, C
′
ex))). This example illustrates that in
SolveStrategy one cannot dispense with the last step, namely checking the substitutions,
and that one has to try the different constraint systems in the sound and complete
solution set for C.
6 Proof of the Main Theorem
We now present the proof of Theorem 6. Obviously, SolveStrategy always terminates. We
need to prove soundness and completeness of SolveStrategy. This is done in Section 6.1
and 6.2, respectively.
First we will introduce some additional notation that will be used in the proof.
Let P be a protocol, C = ((C1, C ′1), . . . , (Cl, C ′l)) be a strategy property, and q ∈ GP .
A q-tree is a q-strategy tree where, however, only condition 1. and 2. need to be satisfied
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(see Definition 3). A (concrete) path π for P is a q0-tree where q0 is the initial state of
P and every vertex in π only has at most one direct successor. A (concrete) branching
structure for P is defined analogously to symbolic branching structures only that now
the symbolic path is a concrete path π and the symbolic strategy trees Ti are concrete
trees. Such a branching structure satisfies C if Ti satisfies (Ci, C ′i) for every i. Obviously,
we have:
Remark 8 (P, C) ∈ g-Strategy iff there exists a concrete branching structure for P
which satisfies C.
With B = π, T1, . . . , Tl we will always denote a concrete branching structure for
protocol P where π = (V π, Eπ, rπ, `πV , `
π
E) and Ti = (V i, Ei, ri, `iV , `iE) for every i. Recall
that B is a q0-tree (V,E, r, `V , `E). In particular, V = V
π∪V 1∪· · ·∪V l, E = Eπ∪E1∪
· · · ∪ El, r = rπ, and `V and `E coincide with the labeling functions of the components
of B on the respective domains. For a symbolic or concrete tree T , we write v ∈ T to
say that v is a vertex in T . Analogously, we write (v, v ′) ∈ T if (v, v′) is an edge in T .
Note that since branching structures are trees so we may also write v ∈ B if v ∈ V and
(v, v′) ∈ B if (v, v′) ∈ E.
For v ∈ B let `V (v) = ((Πv1, . . . ,Πvn), σv, Iv,Sv) and Πvj = (V vj , Evj , rvj , `vj).
As usual, for an edge (v, v′) in B, we talk about the transition (in GP ) associated with
(v, v′). If i, R ⇒ S, f is the principal, principal rule, and principal vertex associated
with this transition, respectively, then we call i, R⇒ S, and f , the principal, principal
rule, and principal vertex, respectively, associated with (v, v ′).
Analogously, Bs = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl will always denote a symbolic branching structure.
The naming convention is the same as above where, however, we always add an s
as a superscript. For instance, we write πs = (V s,π, Es,π, rs,π, `s,πV , `
s,π
E ) and Π
s,v
j =






j ). The transitions, prinicpals, principal rules, and principal vertices
associated with edges in Bs are defined as above.
Recall that for a symbolic branching structure Bs we denote the branching structure
constructed from Bs in step two of SolveStrategy by B
s
. We refer to the components of
B
s




j and so on.
Let qs = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I,S) be a symbolic state reachable from the initial symbolic
state of P and associated with the set X of used variables. (Recall from Section 5.1
that the variables in X are indexed with vertices.) Let ν be a substitution of the
variables in X . We denote by ν(qs) the tuple ν(qs) = ((Π′1, . . . ,Π′n), ν|X , Iν,Sν) where
Π′i is obtained from Πi by dropping the indices of variables in X and ν|X is ν with the
domain restricted to X .
For a symbolic qs-tree T = (V,E, r, `V , `E) and a substitution ν of the variables








j if `E(v, v
′) = j, f
j, ν(R), I if `E(v, v
′) = j, f, I and `j(rj, f) = R⇒ S
j, ν(R), sc if `E(v, v
′) = j, f, R, sc
for every v, v′ ∈ V and (v, v′) ∈ E where rj denotes the root of the jth principal Πj in
the symbolic state `V (v) and `j denotes the labeling function of Πj.
Now, for a branching structure Bs = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl and a substitution ν, we define
ν(Bs) to be ν(πs), ν(T s1 ), . . . , ν(T sl ).
We say that ν solves Bs (w.r.t. the strategy property C) if ν(Bs) is a concrete branch-
ing structure (which satisfies C).
A root path π′ in B is a sequence π′ = v1, . . . , vn of vertices vi ∈ B such that
(vi, vi+1) ∈ B and v1 is the root of B (and hence, of π). If ρi = Ri ⇒ Si denotes the
principal rule associated with the edge (vi, vi+1) ∈ B, then ρ = ρπ′ = ρ1, . . . , ρn−1 is
called the pr-sequence associated with π ′. Given a set I of messages we call a ground
substitution σ of the variables occurring in ρ, a solution of ρ w.r.t. I if Riσ ∈ d(Is,viσ})
for every i. We call σ a solution of π′ if σ is a solution of ρπ′ w.r.t. I0.
6.1 Soundness of SolveStrategy
In this section, we show soundness of SolveStrategy. First, we need to introduce some
more notation and prove basic properties.
6.1.1 Notation and Basic Properties
For terms t, t′, t′′, we denote by t|t′→t′′ the term obtained from t by replacing every
occurrence of t′ by t′′. For a set E of terms and a substitution σ, E|t′→t′′ and σ|t′→t′′ are
defined in the obvious way.
Terms can be viewed as finite vertex-labeled ordered trees where the vertices are
labeled with function symbols and the number of direct successors of a vertex is exactly
the arity of the function symbol the vertex is labelled with. For a term t, we write v ∈ t
to say that v is a vertex of t and t↓v to denote the subterm of t rooted at vertex v of t.
We say that a term t only occurs in the context of {t′}st in the term t′′ if for all v ∈ t′′
with t′′↓v = t we have that t′′↓v′ = {t′}st where v′ is the direct predecessor of v in t′′. For
a set of terms E we say that t only occurs in the context of {t′}st in E if t only occurs
in the context of {t′}st in all terms t′′ ∈ E. Let σ be a substitution. We say that t only
occurs in the context of {t′}st in σ if t only occurs in the context of {t′}st in all σ(x) for
x ∈ dom(σ).
A term t only occurs in key positions in a term t′ if for every vertex v of t′ with
t′↓v = t, there exists an ancestor v′ of v in t′ labeled with {·}s◦, {·}a◦, or sig◦(·) such that
v is the direct succesor of v′ that corresponds to the ◦ subterm or is a descendant of the
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direct succesor of v′ that corresponds to the ◦ subterm. Otherwise, we say that t occurs
in a non-key position in t′. For example, x only occurs in a key position in the term
{〈a, b〉}s〈c,x〉 but not in the term {〈x, b〉}sc.
The following lemma can easily be shown by induction on the length of derivations
using the same techniques as for example in [13, 10].
Lemma 9 Let E be a set of messages, and m1, m2, m3, m4 be messages with m1 =
{m2}sm3 . If m1 ∈ E and m3 /∈ d(E), then we have d(E)|m1→m4 ⊆ d(E|m1→m4).
We will also need the following lemma:
Lemma 10 Let R be a term, m1, m2 be messages, k ∈ A be an atom, and σ be a ground
substitution such that k /∈ Sub(R) and k only occurs in the context of {m1}sk in σ. Then,
(Rσ)|{m1}sk→m2
= R(σ|{m1}sk→m2).
Proof. First observe that there does not exist a subterm t of R such that t is not a
variable and tσ = {m1}sk. Otherwise, since k /∈ Sub(R), t would be of the form {t′}sx
for some t′ and variable x, and hence, σ(x) = k in contradiction to the assumption that
k only occurs in the context of {m1}sk in σ. From this, the claim of the lemma follows
easily. 2
The proof of the following lemma is obvious.
Lemma 11 Let E be a set of messages and k,m messages. If k only occurs in the
context of {m}sk in E, then k only occurs in the context of {m}sk in d(E).
From the above lemmas, we obtain:
Lemma 12 Let k1, . . . , kn ∈ A be pairwise distinct atoms, let I1 and I2 be sets of
terms such that {k1, . . . , kn} ∩ Sub(I1) = ∅ and I2 = {{t1}sk1 , . . . , {tn}skn} for some
terms ti such that {k1, . . . , kn} ∩ Sub(ti) = ∅. Let σ be a ground substitution such that
{k1, . . . , kn} ∩ Sub(σ(x)) = ∅ for every variable x. Then, the following is true for every
term R with {k1, . . . , kn} ∩ Sub(R) = ∅:
1. Rσ ∈ d(I1σ ∪ I2σ) implies that Rσ ∈ d(I1σ).
2. {R}skiσ ∈ d(I1σ ∪ I2σ) implies that Rσ = tiσ for every i.
Proof. To show statement 1., we first observe that ki /∈ d(I1σ∪I2σ). Now, iteratively
applying Lemma 9 for every i with m1 = {ti}skiσ and some intruder atom m4 allows us
to eliminate the messages in I2σ. Statement 2. easily follows with Lemma 11. 2
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6.1.2 Proof of Soundness
Let P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I) be a protocol and C = ((C1, C ′1), . . . , (Cl, C ′l)) be a strategy
property. We have to show that if SolveStrategy outputs yes, then (P, C) ∈ g-Strategy.
Assume that SolveStrategy outputs yes and let Bs = πs, T s1 , . . . , T sl be the symbolic
branching structure guessed in the first step of SolveStrategy. Let C = CBs be the
corresponding constraint system constructed in the second step of the algorithm and
let C′ be the simple constraint system returned by the constraint solver such that the
complete solution ν associated with C′ passes the tests in the third step of SolveStrategy.
Basically, we want to show that ν solves Bs w.r.t. C. Recall that this means that
ν(Bs) is a conrete branching structure which satisfies C. The main problem is that ν
might contain secure channel keys (see Section 5.2.2). With these keys, ν cannot solve
Bs since they do not occur in Bs. In what follows, we will therefore iteratively eliminate
these keys in ν such that in every step ν satisfies certain conditions w.r.t. B
s
and C
(recall the definition of B
s
and C from Section 5.2.2). This iterative process will yield
a ground substitution µ for which we then show that it solves Bs w.r.t. C.
Given a substitution σ, the mentioned conditions w.r.t. B
s
and C are the following:
a) For every root path π of B
s
the substitution σ is a solution for π.
b) σ solves the strategy property constraints of C.
c) σ solves the unification constraints of C.
d) σ passes the checks of step 3. of SolveStrategy.
In what follows, let σ be a substitution which satisfies the condition a) to d), and
let k ∈ Ksc be a secure channel key and {t}sk be the corresponding encoding term (see
Section 5.2.2). We want to eliminate k from σ (if it occurs) and show that the resulting
substitution still satisfies the above conditions. For this purpose, we first prove:
Lemma 13 The secure channel key k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk in σ.
Proof. Assume that there exists a variable z in the domain of σ such that k does not
only occur in the context of {tσ}sk in σ(z). Note that by construction, z is of the form xv
where v is a vertex in Bs and x is a variable in P . Let z be minimal with this property.
That is, there exists v ∈ Bs such that z ∈ Xv (the set of used variables at vertex v) and
for every proper ancestor v′ ∈ Bs of v, z /∈ Xv′ and every z′ ∈ Xv′ k only occurs in the
context of {tσ}sk in σ(z′). Let z and v be as above and let π′ = v1, . . . , vn with vn = v be
a root path in B
s
and ρ = ρBπ′ = ρ1, . . . , ρn−1 the pr-sequence associated with π
′ where
ρi = Ri ⇒ Si. Since σ satisfies condition a), we know that Rnσ ∈ d(Is,vn−1σ) (recall
the definition of Is,vn−1 from above). Clearly, k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk in
Is,vn−1. Also, V(Is,vn−1) ⊆ Xvn−1 . And hence, k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk for
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every z′ ∈ V(Is,vn−1). From this we can conclude (*): k only occurs in the context of
{tσ}sk in I
s,vn−1
σ. By Lemma 11, we conclude that k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk
in Rnσ. However, we also have that z ∈ V(Rn) and that k does not only occur in the
context of {tσ}sk in σ(z). From this it follows that there exists a subterm of Rn of the
form {t}sz for some term t and that σ(z) = k. By the feasibility condition on principals
we know that z ∈ d(I ∪ {R1, . . . , Rn}) where I is the union of the initial knowledge of
the principals in P and we consider variables as constants. Because of the minimality,
we know that z only occurs in Rn and it follows that z must occur in a non-key position
in Rn. Hence, k also occurs in a non-key position in Rnσ in contradiction to (*). 2
Using Lemma 13, we obtain:
Lemma 14 Let π′ = v1, . . . , vn be a root path of B
s
and ρ = ρ1, . . . , ρn−1 with ρi =
Ri ⇒ Si the pr-sequence associated with π′. Also, let Ivi = I
s,vi
be defined as above.
Then, k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk in Iviσ and Riσ for every i.
Proof. By the construction of B
s
, we know that k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk in
Ivi and Ri for every i. From this together with Lemma 13, the claim follows immediately.
2
Let a ∈ AI be a new intruder atom and define σ′ = σ|m→a where m = {tσ}sk. Note
that, due to Lemma 13, k does not occur in σ′ anymore.
Claim I. σ′ satisfies the condition a) to d).
Proof of Claim I. a) Let π′ = v1, . . . , vn, ρ, ρi, Ri, Si, and Ivi be given as in Lemma 14.
By assumption the substitution σ satisfies a), and hence, σ solves π ′. That is, Riσ ∈
d(Ivi−1σ) for every i. We want to show that Riσ′ ∈ d(Ivi−1σ′) for every i. We consider
different cases:
If k does not occur in Riσ and Ivi−1σ, then Riσ = Riσ′ and Ivi−1σ = Ivi−1σ′, and
hence, Riσ
′ ∈ d(Ivi−1σ′).
Otherwise, by construction of B
s
, we have that {t}sk ∈ Ivi−1 , and hence, m ∈ Ivi−1σ.
By Lemma 14, we know that (**) k only occurs in the context of {tσ}sk in Iviσ and Riσ.
Now, if k ∈ Sub(Ri), then by construction of Bs, we know that Ri is of the form {t′}sk
for some term t′. It follows that Riσ = m. Obviously, we have that m = {t}skσ = {t}skσ′.
Thus, m ∈ Ivi−1σ′, and therefore, Riσ′ ∈ d(Ivi−1σ′).
In case, k /∈ Sub(Ri), we can apply Lemma 10 and obtain that (Riσ)|m→a = Riσ′.
Moreover, using Lemma 11 and (**), we know that k /∈ d(Ivi−1σ). Now, we can apply
Lemma 9 and obtain that Riσ
′ = (Riσ)|m→a ∈ d((Ivi−1σ)|m→a). For S ∈ Ivi−1 such
that k /∈ S, Lemma 10 implies Sσ′ = (Sσ)|m→a. By construction of B
s
, if k ∈ Sub(S),
then S = {t}sk, and hence, Sσ = m. Since a ∈ AI ⊆ d((Ivi−1σ)|m→a), we obtain that
d((Ivi−1σ)|m→a) ⊆ d(Ivi−1σ′). Consequently, Riσ′ ∈ d(Ivi−1σ′).
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b) We need to show that for every c ∈ Ci and root path π′ = v1, . . . , vn where vn
is a leaf in T si , we have that c ∈ d(I
s,vn
σ′). We know that σ solves C, and hence, c ∈
d(Is,vnσ). From this, using the same arguments as above, we obtain that c ∈ d(Is,vnσ′).
c) Let
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′ : I, {〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′
be a unification constraint. We know that σ solves this constraint. Hence,
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ∈d(Iσ ∪ {{〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ}).
Since by construction of C, k′ is only used in this contraint, it is easy to see that
k′ /∈ d(Iσ). Therefore,
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ = {〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ.
Moreover, by construction of C we have that k /∈ Sub(Ri) for every i, and hence, using
Lemma 10 it follows that
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ′ = {〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk′σ′.
Thus, σ′ solves the unification constraint.
d) We know that σ passes the tests 1., 2.,(a), and 2.,(b) in the third step of
SolveStrategy. We know that (*) C ′i ∩ d(I
s,v
σ) = ∅ for every leaf v of T si and every
i. If there exists c ∈ C ′i ∩ d(I
s,v
σ′), then it is easy to see that, since a is new in-
truder atom, from (Iv,sσ′)|a→{t}skσ we can still derive c. Together with the fact that
(Is,vσ′)|a→{t}skσ = I
s,v
σ, this is a contradiction to (*).
To see that for σ′, the tests 2.,(a) and 2.(b) still pass, it suffices to observe that if the
matching conditions in 2.,(a),iii and 2.,(b),iii are satisfied for σ ′, then also for σ. Here
we again use that a is a new constant and that we can replace a again by {t}skσ. This
concludes the proof of Claim I.
By assumption, ν was returned by SolveStrategy, and hence, solves C and passes the test
in the third step of SolveStrategy, we immediately obtain that ν satisfies the conditions
a) to d). Claim I allows us to iteratively eliminate all secure channel keys in ν. We
denote the resulting substitution by µ.
Claim II. µ(Bs) is a concrete branching structure for P which satisfies C.
By Remark 8, Claim II implies soundness of SolveStrategy.
Proof of Claim II. We first show that every edge in µ(Bs) corresponds to a transition
in GP by induction on the length of root paths π′ = v1, . . . , vh in Bs. That is, we show
by induction on h that
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(i) µ(`sV )(v1) is the initial state of P ,
(ii) µ(`sV )(vi) ∈ GP for i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, and
(iii) µ(`sV )(vi)
µ(`sE)(vi,vi+1)−→ µ(`sV )(vi+1) ∈ GP for i ∈ {1, . . . , h− 1}.
For h = 1, we only need to show that µ(`sV )(v1) is the initial state of P , which is obvious.










i ⇒ Ssi be the pr-sequence associated with








i be the pr-sequence associated with
π′ in B
s
. Moreover, let µ(Is,vi) be the intruder’s knowledge at vi in µ(Bs). Note that
µ(Is,vi) ⊆ I0 ∪ {Ss1µ, . . . , Ssi−1µ} where I0 is the initial intruder knowledge in P . This
inclusion could be strict since some of the Ssj may be secure channel terms, and hence,
are not written into the intruder’s knowledge. Let µ(Is,vi) = I0 ∪ {Ss1µ, . . . , S
s
i−1µ} be
the intruder’s knowledge at vi w.r.t. B
s
. Recall that for B
s
all messages are written into
the intruder’s knowledge.
Obviously, point (i) still holds. By the induction hypothesis, we know that µ(`sV )(vi)
∈ GP for i ∈ {1, . . . , h} and µ(`sV )(vi)
µ(`sE)(vi ,vi+1)−→ µ(`sV )(vi+1) ∈ GP for every i ∈
{1, . . . , h − 1}. We have to show that µ(`sV )(vh+1) ∈ GP and µ(`sV )(vh)
µ(`sE)(vh ,vh+1)−→
µ(`sV )(vh+1) ∈ GP . We distinguish between the different types of the symbolic transi-
tions. For symbolic ε-transitions this is obvious.
For symbolic intruder transitions, the main point to show is that Rshµ ∈ d(µ(Is,vh)).









)). We know that µ(Is,vh) ⊆ µ(Is,vh)
and that the only difference between µ(Is,vh) and µ(Is,vh) is that the latter set may
contain secure channel encoding messages. Since µ, Rsh, and the terms in Is,vh do not
contain secure channel keys, we immediately obtain Rshµ ∈ d(µ(Is,vh)) by Lemma 12.
The argument in case Rsh is a secure channel term is similar.
For symbolic secure channel transition, assume that `sE(vh, vh+1) is of the form
j, f, sc(n, n′, R′), sc. We have to show that µ(sc(n, n′, R′)) ∈ µ(Ss,vh) and µ(Rsvh) =
µ(sc(n, n′, R′)) where Ss,vh denotes the secure channel in the symbolic state `sV (vh) . By
definition of symbolic secure channel transitions, we know that sc(n, n′, R′) ∈ Ss,vh , and





h is of the form {R}sk for some secure channel key k such that {R′}sk ∈ I
s,vh
and k does not occur in any other term in Is,vh. We know that Rshµ ∈ d(I
s,vh
µ). Since
k does not occur in µ nor in R and R′, with Lemma 12 we obtain that Rµ = R′µ, and
thus, µ(Rsh) = µ(sc(n, n
′, R′)). We now have shown that the edges in µ(Bs) correspond
to transitions in GP .
The last step is to show that µ(T sj ) is a strategy tree for (Cj, C ′j). Properties 1. and
2. of Definition 3 are satisfied as we have just shown. Property 3. of Definition 3 follows
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directly from Property 3. of the definition of symbolic strategy trees. Properties 4. and
5. of Definition 3 follow directly from the fact that µ passes the checks 2.,(a) and 2.,(b)
in the last step of SolveStrategy.
6.2 Completeness of SolveStrategy
In this section, we show completeness of SolveStrategy. We have to show that if (P, C) ∈
g-Strategy, then there is a run of SolveStrategy in which yes is returned. By Remark
8, if (P, C) ∈ g-Strategy, there exists a branching structure B for P that satisfies C.
Given B, our proof of completeness proceeds in three steps. First, we turn B into a
symbolic branching structure Bs together with a substitution τ such that τ(Bs) = B.
Note that SolveStrategy can guess Bs in its first step. Second, we consider the constraint
system C that is constructed in the second step of SolveStrategy if Bs was guessed in the
first step of the algorithm and show that τ is a solution of C. It follows that τ is also a
solution of a simple constraint system, say C′, in the sound and complete solution set
of C. Thus, there is a run of the constraint solver which outputs C′. We finally show
that the substitution τC′ associated with C
′ passes the tests performed in the third step
of SolveStrategy, and hence, SolveStrategy outputs yes.
For our proof to work, we have to assume that B is what we call a minimal branch-
ing structure. We show that this assumption is w.l.o.g. Roughly speaking, minimal
branching structures satisfy two properties: First, they should not contain superfluous
transistions. Second, the secure channel transitions are in some sense complete. We
now define these structures formally.
6.2.1 Notation and Basic Properties
To define minimal branching structures, we first need to introduce sc-functions and sc-
completeness. To motivate these notions, we sketch the first step of our completeness
proof, namely, how B is turned into a symbolic branching structure Bs.
Given B, the symbolic branching structure Bs and the substitution τ mentioned
above are constructed in an inductive manner starting from the root of B. Given a
vertex v such that the symbolic state associated with v is already defined and the
substitution τ is already defined for the variables in Xv (the set of variables used in
vertex v),1 we will define for each vertex v′ ∈ B with (v, v′) ∈ B the symbolic transition
label of the edge (v, v′) and the symbolic state associated with v′ in Bs together with the
substitution of the variables used in v′. In order to define the symbolic secure channel
components of the state associated with vertex v ∈ Bs we will define so-called valid sc-
functions. Informally speaking, a valid sc-function for a concrete branching structure B
associates with each vertex v ∈ B a sequence of secure channel terms which corresponds
1Recall the definition of used variables from Section 5.1.
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to a possible symbolic secure channel state in v ∈ Bs. More precisely, a valid sc-function
`sc associates with the root r of B the empty sequence, this corresponds to the empty
secure channel in the symbolic state associated with r in Bs. Whenever a secure channel
message m is written into the secure channel by a transition from vertex v to v ′ in B,
then the sequence of secure channel terms associated with v ′ is that of v extended by
the right-hand side of the principal rule associated with the edge (v, v ′). Whenever a
secure channel message m′ is read from the secure channel, a particular secure channel
term which matches with m′ is removed from the sequence `sc(v) of secure channel terms
associated with v.
Formally, we call a sequence s = (S1, . . . , Sk) of sc-terms, an sc-sequence. For a term
S, a substitution σ of variables occurring in Si for some i, and a message m, we say that





(S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sk) if Siσ = m and Sj 6= Si for all j < i and
S is not a sc-term,
(S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sk, S) if Siσ = m and Sj 6= Si for all j < i and
S is a sc-term.
We call the term Si the term removed from s.
A function `sc which maps every vertex v ∈ B to a sc-sequence is called an sc-function.
Such a function is valid if for every v ∈ B the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Sv = σv({S1, . . . , Sk}) with `sc(v) = (S1, . . . , Sk).
2. If v′ is a successor of v in B and `E(v, v′) is of the form i or i,m, I (i.e., the




`sc(v) if S is not an sc-term
(S1, . . . , Sk, S) otherwise
where S is the right-hand side of the principal rule associated with (v, v ′).
3. If v′ is a successor of v in B and `E(v, v′) is of the form i,m, sc (i.e., the transition
associated with (v, v′) is a secure channel transition), then `sc(v
′) is a (S,m, σv)-
successor of `sc(v) where S is the right-hand side of the principal rule associated
with (v, v′).
In 3., if S ′ is the term removed from `sc(v), we call S ′ the sc-term removed in (v, v′).
For ε- and intruder transitions, there is no removed sc-term.
As mentioned above, minimal branching structures satisfy two properties: i) there
are not superfluous transitions and ii) the secure channel transitions are in some sense
complete. To motivate the latter condition, we need to sketch the last step of our
completeness proof.
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In the last step of the proof of completeness of SolveStrategy, we show that τC′ passes
the checks performed in the last step of SolveStrategy. Condition 2.,(a) of these checks
says that all secure channel messages in the secure channel which could be read by
applying a principal rule are in fact read by applying this rule. For this condition to be
satisfied by τC′, we have to impose some specific structure on the branching structure
B.
Suppose, for example, that the symbolic secure channel Ss,v associated with v ∈
Bs contains terms sc(n, n′, x) and sc(n, n′, y) and τ(x) = τ(y) where Bs and τ are
the symbolic branching structure and substitution constructed from B, respectively.
Furthermore, assume that there is a principal rule of the form sc(n, n′, z)⇒ S applicable
at v in B, then, by definition of strategy trees (Definition 3, 4.) there has to be a
secure channel transition with sc(n, n′, z) ⇒ S being the associated principal rule of
this transition where the message τ(sc(n, n′, x)) = τ(sc(n, n′, y)) is read from the secure
channel. In the corresponding symbolic secure channel transition one of the two terms
sc(n, n′, x) and sc(n, n′, y) is removed from the symbolic secure channel. The substitution
τC′ does not have to fulfill the condition τC′(x) = τC′(y) anymore. So the messages
τC′(sc(n, n
′, x)) and τC′(sc(n, n
′, y)) are not necessarily the same. Still, both could be
read when applying sc(n, n′, z) ⇒ S, and hence, in the concrete branching structure
induced by Bs and τC′ there must be secure channel transitions for both messages.
Therefore, we want to make sure that these transition already occur in B. This is
captured by the notion of sc-completeness.
We call B sc-complete if there is a valid sc-function `sc for B and for all j, v ∈ Vj,
and successors v′ of v in B such that2
• the label of the transition associated with (v, v′) is i,m, sc for some i and m ∈ Sv,
• the principal vertex associated with (v, v′) is f for some vertex f in Πvi , and
• the right-hand side of the principal rule associated with (v, v ′) is S for some term
S
the following conditions are satisfied: For every (S,m, σv)-successor s of `sc(v), there
is a successor v′′ of v such that `sc(v
′′) = s, the label of the transition associated with
(v, v′′) is i,m, sc, and the principal vertex associated with (v, v ′′) is f .
We can now define minimal concrete branching structures. The conditions 2.-4. say
that there are no superfluous transitions in the strategy trees of a minimal branching
structure. These conditions correspond to the conditions 4. to 6. for symbolic strategy
trees. The first condition is the completeness condition explained above.
Definition 15 A branching structure B for P is called minimal if it satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
2Recall the definition of Vj from the beginning of Section 6.
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1. B is sc-complete.
2. For all i and (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ Ei where v′ 6= v′′ and the transitions associated
with (v, v′) and (v, v′′) are ε-transitions, it holds that the principals associated with
(v, v′) and (v, v′′), respectively, differ or the principal vertices associated with (v, v ′)
and (v, v′′), respectively, differ.
3. For all i and (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ Ei where v′ 6= v′′ and the transitions associated with
(v, v′) and (v, v′′) are secure channel transitions, it holds that the principals asso-
ciated with (v, v′) and (v, v′′), respectively, differ, the principal vertices associated
with (v, v′) and (v, v′′), respectively, differ, or the sc-terms removed in (v, v ′) and
(v, v′′), respectively, differ.
4. For all i and (v, v′), (v, v′′) ∈ Ei it holds that if `V (v, v′) = j,m, I for some j and
m, then `V (v, v
′′) = j,m, I.
The following lemma is easy to show.
Lemma 16 If there exists a branching structure for P which satisfies C, then there
exists a minimal branching structure with this property.
6.2.2 Proof of Completeness
Having defined minimal branching structures, we can now proceed with the proof of
completeness. As mentioned, by Remark 8, we have to show that if there exists a
branching structure B for P which satisfies C, then there exists a successful run of
SolveStrategy, i.e., SolveStrategy outputs yes.
By Lemma 16, we may assume that there exists a minimal branching structure B for
P which satisfies C. Let `sc be the corresponding valid sc-function for B. Throughout
the rest of this section, we use the notation as introduced in Section 6.2.1. We recall
the main steps of the proof of completeness, which were briefly sketched above:
1. Construct a symbolic branching structure Bs and a substitution τ such that
τ(Bs) = B.
2. Show that τ is a solution of the constraint system C constructed from Bs in the
second step of SolveStrategy.
3. Since τ is a solution of C, we know that there exists a simple constraint system
C′ in the sound and complete solution set of C such that τ solves C′. Let τC′ be
the solution associated with C′. We show that τC′ passes the checks performed in
the third step of SolveStrategy.
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The symbolic branching structure Bs in 1. can be guessed in the first step of algorithm
SolveStrategy. Moreover, there is a computation path of the constraint solver such that
C′ is returned. Given 3., τC′ passes the checks in the third step of SolveStrategy. Hence,
SolveStrategy returns yes, which shows that SolveStrategy is complete. It remains to
show 1. to 3.:
1. Constructing Bs. Our goal is to construct a symbolic branching structure Bs for
P and a substitution τ such that τ(Bs) = B. In particular, we define Bs in such a way
that the set of vertices and edges of Bs coincides with the set of vertices and edges in
B, respectively. More precisely, define
• V s,π = V π and V s,i = V i for every i, and
• Es,π = Eπ and Es,i = Ei for every i, and
• rs,π = rπ and rs,i = ri for every i,
It remains to define the labeling functions `sV and `
s
E of B
s and the sets of used
variables associated with each vertex v ∈ V . For the root r of πs we set `sV (r) = qs0
where qs0 is the symbolic initial state of the protocol P . We define the set Xr of used
variables to be empty.
Assume that for v ∈ V the set of used variables Xv and the symbolic state `sV (v)
associated with v are already defined. Let v′ ∈ V with (v, v′) ∈ E. We need to define
`sE(v, v
′) and `s(v′).
We define the first component of `E(v, v
′) to be j. We know that `V (v)
`E(v,v
′)−→ `V (v′) ∈
GP . Let f the principal vertex associated with this transition. Let X ′ = V(R) \ Xv
where `vj (r
v





j ↓ f where Π̂s,vj is Πs,vj with variables x ∈ X ′ renamed by xv′ . In the
following, we denote by R̂ and Ŝ the terms R and S where the variables x ∈ X ′ are
renamed by xv′ .
The set Xv′ of used variables in v′ is set to be Xv′ = Xv ∪ {xv′ | x ∈ X ′}.
To define the intruder knowledge Is,v′ , the secure channel component Ss,v′ of `sV (v′)
and the edge label `sE(v, v
′), we distinguish between the different types of transition
labels `E(v, v
′).
• `E(v, v′) = j (ε-transition): We define
(a) `sE(v, v
′) = j, f .
(b) Is,v′ = Is,v ∪ {Ŝ} if Ŝ is not a secure channel term and Is,v′ = Is,v ∪ {R′} if
Ŝ is a secure channel term of the form Ŝ = sc(·, ·, R′).
(c) Ss,v′ = Ss,v if Ŝ is not a secure channel term and Ss,v′ = Ss,v ∪ {Ŝ} if Ŝ is a
secure channel term.
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• `E(v, v′) = j,m, I (intruder transition): We define `sE(v, v′) = j, f, I and the rest
as in (b) and (c) above.
• `E(v, v′) = j,m, sc (secure channel transition): We define `sE(v, v′) = j, f, S ′, sc
where `sc(v
′) is a (Ŝ,m, σv)-succesor of `sc(v) and S ′ is the term removed from
`sc(v). The intruder knowledge Is,v′ is updated as in (b) above. The secure
channel component is updated to Ss,v′ = Ss,v \ {S ′} if Ŝ is not a secure channel
term and Ss,v′ = Ss,v \ {S ′} ∪ {Ŝ} if Ŝ is a secure channel term.
Using the fact that B is a minimal (concrete) branching structure, it is easy to verify
that Bs is a symbolic branching structure.
We now define the substitution τ . The domain of τ is the set X = ⋃v∈V Xv, i.e., the
set of used variables in Bs. For a variable xv ∈ X we set τ(xv) = σv(x). By induction on
n, it is easy to see that for each root path v1, . . . , vn in B
s we have that τ(`sV (vi)) = `V (vi)
and τ(`sE(vi, vi+1)) = `E(vi, vi+1) for every i. From this, it immediately follows that
τ(Bs) = B.
2. τ solves C. We have to show that τ is a solution of the constraint system C
constructed from B
s
. There are three types of constraints in C: First, constraints that
were introduced for an edge (v, v′) ∈ E, the intruder constraints; second, the unification
constraints; and third, the strategy constraints.
Let R : T be an intruder constraint of C that was introduced for the edge (v, v ′) ∈
E. We have to show that τ(R) ∈ d(τ(T )). There are three different cases that we
have to distinguish: (a) `E(v, v
′) = j,m, I and m is not a secure channel message, (b)
`E(v, v
′) = j,m, I and m is a secure channel message, and (c) `E(v, v′) = j,m, sc.
(a) We know that τ(R) = σv
′
(R) = m ∈ d(Iv) because R is the left-hand side of the
principel rule associated with the edge (v, v′) in B. By construction of B
s
, we
have that Iv ⊆ τ(Is,v) = τ(T ) where Is,v is the intruder’s knowledge at vertex v
in B
s
. Thus, it follows that m ∈ d(τ(T )).
(b) We know that m is of the form m = sc(n,n′, m′) with m′ = τ(R). We have that
m ∈ d(Iv). Since, by construction, Iv does not contain secure channel terms, it
follows that n ∈ Iv and m′ ∈ d(Iv). As in (a) we know that Iv ⊆ τ(Is,v) = τ(T ).
Thus, m′ ∈ d(τ(T )).
(c) The term R is a term of the form {R′}skw′ where kw′ is the sc-key introduced in
the transition associated with an edge (w,w′) ∈ E where w is a predecessor of
v. So the left-hand side of the principal rule associated with (v, v ′) in Bs has
the form sc(n,n′, R′) and the right-hand side of the principal rule associated with
(w,w′) in Bs has the form sc(n,n′, R′′). We know that τ(sc(n,n′, R′)) = m =
τ(sc(n,n′, R′′)). Hence, τ({R′}skw′ ) = τ({R
′′}skw′ ). Since {R
′′}skv′′ ∈ T , it follows
that τ({R′}skw′ ) ∈ d(τ(T )).
36
Now, let
{〈R1, 〈R2, 〈. . . Rn−2, Rn−1〉 · · ·〉〉}sk : I, {〈R2, 〈R3, 〈. . . Rn−1, Rn〉 · · ·〉〉}sk
be a unification constraint that was introduced when traversing v ∈ V in step 2. of
SolveStrategy. Because B is minimal, by Definition 15, 4. we know that if v has more
than one outgoing intruder transition, then the messages delivered are the same. From
this it follows that τ fulfills the unification constraint above.
Since a strategy constraint is of the form a : Is,v for a leaf v ∈ Ti and a ∈ Ci for
some i and τ(T si ) = Ti fulfills (Ci, C ′i) we know that τ fulfills this constraint.
3. τC′ passes the tests. We will first show that τ passes the checks that are performed
in step 3. of SolveStrategy and from this it will follow that τC′ passes these checks.
I) Let v be a leaf of some Ti. We know that C ′i∩d(Iv) = ∅ and that τ(`sV (v)) = `V (v).
Consequently, τ passes the first check because Ti satisfies (Ci, C ′i).
II) For every i and vertex v ∈ V i, we have to show that the following conditions are
satisfied:
(a) For every (ground term) m ∈ Ss,vτ , h, f such that
i. (rs,vh , f) ∈ Es,vh ,
ii. `s,vh (r
s,v
h , f) = R→ · for some R,
iii. Rτ matches with m
there is an edge (v, v′) ∈ E such that the label τ(`sE(v, v′)) is h,m, sc and
`sE(v, v
′) has the form h, f, ·, sc.
(b) If there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ E such that
i. the transition corresponding to the edge (v, v′) is labeled with h, f, I,
ii. `s,vh (r
s,v, f) = R→ · for some R, and
iii. there exists f ′ such that f ′ 6= f , (rs,vh , f ′) ∈ Es,vh , `s,vh (rs,vh , f ′) = R′ → ·
for some R′, and R′τ matches with R̂τ where R̂ is obtained from R by
replacing all variables of the form x in R, i.e., those variables not indexed
by vertices yet, by xv′ .
then there exists v′′ such that (v, v′′) ∈ E and the label of (v, v′′) in Bs is
h, f ′, I.
Let v ∈ V i for some i. To show (a), let m ∈ Ss,vτ , h, and f satisfy i, ii, and iii as
above. We know that τ(T si ) = Ti for all i. Since Ti is a strategy tree, there is an edge
(v, v′) ∈ E such that the label is τ(`sE(v, v′)) = `E(v, v′) = h,m, sc. This completes test
(a).
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To show (b), let (v, v′) ∈ E and h, f, f ′, R, and R′ satisfy i, ii, and iii as above. We
know that τ(T si ) = Ti for all i. Since Ti is a strategy tree, there is a vertex v′′ such that
the label of (v, v′′) is h,m, I and the principal vertex associated with (v, v ′) in B is f .
By construction of Bs, we have that the label of (v, v′′) is h, f ′, I as desired.
So τ passes the checks performed in step 3. of SolveStrategy. Now we show that τC′
passes these checks as well.
A) Let v be a leaf of some T si and suppose that there is an atom a ∈ C ′i such that
a ∈ d(IsvτC′). Then it is easy to see that a ∈ d(Isvτ), which is a contradiction to I).
B) We now show that τC′ passes the checks (a) and (b) of the third step of algorithm
SolveStrategy. We start with (a). For this, let m ∈ Ss,vτC′, h, f such that
i. (rs,vh , f) ∈ Es,vh ,
ii. `s,vh (r
s,v
h , f) = R→ S for some R, and
iii. RτC′ matches with m.
Let R′ ∈ Ss,v such that m = R′τC′ . Since RτC′ matches with R′τC′ , it is easy to
see that R′τ matches with Rτ (since τ is obtained from τC′ by replacing intruder
atoms by messages). By definition of `sc, there is a successor v
′ of v such that
rv
′
h = f and `sc(v
′) is a valid (S,m, σv)-successor of `sc(v) with the term R′ removed.
So by construction of Bs, the label `sE(v, v
′) is `sE(v, v




′)) = h,m, sc as desired.
Now we show that τC′ passes the test (b). For this let (v, v
′) ∈ E, h, f, R, f ′ and
R′ satisfy i, ii, and iii as above. We have to show that there is a successor v ′′ of
v in B such that the label of (v, v′′) in Bs is h, f ′, I. Since we know that R′τC′
matches with R̂τC′ , as above we obtain that R
′τ matches with R̂τ . Since τ passes
the test (b), there exists a vertex v′′ such that (v, v′′) ∈ E and the label of (v, v′′)
in Bs is h, f ′, I.
This completes the proof of completeness of SolveStrategy.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that game-theoretic security properties, such as balance, of contract-
signing and related protocols can be decided using standard constraint solving proce-
dures as a black-box. This opens the way for extending existing constraint-based imple-
mentations and tools, which have successfully been employed for reachability properties,
to deal with game-theoretic security properties.
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[4] D. Basin, S. Mödersheim, and L. Viganò. An On-The-Fly Model-Checker for Secu-
rity Protocol Analysis. In E. Snekkenes and D. Gollmann, editors, Proceedings of
the 8th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2003),
volume 2808 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 253–270. Springer, 2003.
[5] R. Chadha, M.I. Kanovich, and A.Scedrov. Inductive methods and contract-signing
protocols. In P. Samarati, editor, 8-th ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security (CCS 2001), pages 176–185. ACM Press, 2001.
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